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•	In	 the	eastern	policies	of	 the	Czech	Republic,	 Slovakia	 and	Hungary,	 re-
lations	with	Ukraine	have	traditionally	remained	in	the	shadow	of	those	






for	Ukraine.	 In	 this	way,	 the	V4	has	contributed	 to	keeping	 the	question	
of	Ukraine	on	the	EU’s	agenda.	The	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia	and	Hungary	
ratified	the	Association	Agreement	between	the	EU	and	Ukraine	quickly,	




their	 eastern	 partner,	 including	 energy	 cooperation,	 supporting	 the	 re-
form	process,	and	offering	humanitarian	aid.
•	Support	for	the	European	aspirations	of	Ukraine	and	other	countries	in	the	
















plies	 immediately	after	 its	annexation	of	Crimea	 (April-November	2014).	

































between	Ukraine	 and	 the	 countries	 of	 Central	 Europe.	 In	 recent	 years,	
Ukraine	 has	 repeatedly	 held	meetings	 in	 the	 V4+	 formula	 at	 the	 presi-
dential,	prime	ministerial	and	ministerial	levels.	On	each	occasion	these	
meetings	 have	 offered	 opportunities	 not	 only	 to	 express	 the	 Visegrad	
States’	support	for	Ukraine’s	integration	with	the	EU,	but	also	to	discuss	
cooperation	in	specific	sectoral	areas.	One	effect	of	this,	for	example,	was	











at	 reinforcing	 people-to-people	 contacts	 between	 Ukraine	 and	 the	 Vise-
grad	states,	but	also	support	the	reform	process	in	Ukraine.	One	example	
of	these	activities	is	the	V4	Civil	Servants’	Mobility	Programme,	which	al-





























in	 reaction	 to	 the	Kremlin’s	policy	 in	Ukraine.	An	 important	 role	 is	 also	
played	by	the	V4+Ukraine	and	V4+Eastern	Partnership	formats,	thanks	to	
which	the	governments	of	the	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia	and	Hungary	have	





















been	 openly	 undermining	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 EU	 sanctions	 against	
Russia,	none	of	the	states	in	the	region	have	chosen	to	block	their	renewal	
in	the	forum	of	the	EU	Council.	In	accordance	with	the	position	agreed	by	

















































to	 gain	 new	markets,	 in	 connection	with	 the	 economic	 problems	 of	 the	
euro-area	states.	Exports	 from	the	Central	European	countries	 to	Russia	
are	of	little	importance	for	their	own	economies,	but	their	collapse	has	hit	



























































































I. CzeCh RepublIC’s polICy towaRds ukRaIne
Two	trends	can	be	discerned	in	the	Czech	government’s	approach	to	Ukraine.	
On	 the	 one	hand,	 Prague	 sees	 the	war	 in	 eastern	Ukraine	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 the	
region’s	 security,	 including	 the	 risk	 of	mass	migration	 to	Central	 Europe.	 In	























































was	 an	 active	 promoter	 of	 the	 Eastern	 Partnership	 programme,	which	was	
launched	 during	 the	 Czech	 presidency	 of	 the	 EU	 Council	 in	 2009.	 In	 2012,	
Ukraine	was	also	regarded	as	one	of	the	priority	areas	in	the	long-term	strat-
egy	 of	 Czech	 export,	 as	 a	 market	 with	 potential	 which	 had	 hitherto	 been	






by	ambitions	 to	 expand	 the	EU	and	NATO”.	The	views	of	 the	Czech	govern-




















































maintaining	 contacts	 at	 the	highest	 level	 and	 in	 the	 formation	of	 the	Czech	
Republic’s	Eastern	policy.
1. ukrainians in the Czech Republic
The	Czech	Republic	has	had	positive	experiences	with	its	community	of	Ukrain-
ians,	which	numbers	about	110,000	(according	to	Czech	data	from	2016);	they	



















































The	Czech	policy	of	 limiting	 the	 influx	of	 foreign	workers	 is	 in	part	a	result	
of	 the	strong	 influence	of	 the	country’s	 trade	unions,	which	have	convinced	
















organisations,	 the	Czech	government	 is	 gradually	 increasing	 the	number	of	
consular	workers	in	Ukraine,	and	has	created	a	 legal	way	to	circumvent	the	























































ginning	 to	 approach	 the	 levels	 they	 were	 at	 before	 the	 Russian-Ukrainian	
war,	thanks	to	growing	exports	from	the	Czech	Republic.	In	2016,	the	Czech	
Republic	exported	goods	to	Ukraine	worth	around	€800	million,	an	increase	
of	42%	on	 the	previous	year,	 although	 this	 is	 still	 about	a	 third	 less	 than	 in	
2013.	Despite	the	collapse	of	trade	in	Ukraine,	it	is	mainly	those	companies	that	
had	good	business	contacts	even	during	the	Yanukovych	government	which	










































production	 facilities	 in	Russia	 (most	 recently	 the	 car	 lighting	manufacturer	
Brisk	and	the	machining	centre	manufacturer	Trimill	have	 taken	this	deci-
sion),	which	would	allow	them	to	reduce	the	administrative	burden.
3. Czech support for ukraine
The	 Czech	 Republic	 was	 conducting	 an	 active	 policy	 of	 transformation	 and	
development	 in	Ukraine	even	before	 the	Maidan,	 and	 in	 recent	years	 it	has	
increased	 its	commitments	 in	 this	country.	The	value	of	projects	 in	Ukraine	

































II. slovakIa’s polICy towaRds ukRaIne
The	Slovak	government	has	two	main	objectives	in	the	context	of	Ukraine:	to	
maintain	 stability	 there,	particularly	 to	 avoid	a	humanitarian	crisis;	 and	 to	
maintain	the	stable	transit	of	oil	and	natural	gas	at	the	highest	possible	levels	
to	Slovakia	via	Ukraine’s	territory.	The	cabinet	of	PM	Robert	Fico	has	declared	
its	 full	 support	 for	Ukrainian	ambitions	 to	 join	 the	EU,	and	 is	 committed	 to	










Unlike	 the	 government,	 President	 Andrej	 Kiska	 has	 openly	 described	 the	
Kremlin’s	policy	 towards	Ukraine	 (and	Georgia)	as	a	 threat	 to	 international	
security.	During	a	visit	to	Kyiv	in	May	2015,	the	Slovak	president	said	that	Slo-
vakia	“will	never	recognise	the	illegal	annexation	of	Crimea,	and	will	never	





At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 Russian-Ukrainian	war,	 Slovakia	 exerted	 great	 re-
straint	 in	 its	 reactions	 to	 the	 conflict,	 above	all	with	 regard	 to	 its	 economic	



































vak	position	remains	 in	 line	with	the	EU	consensus	(the	 lifting	of	sanctions	
is	conditional	on	implementation	of	the	Minsk	agreements).	However,	at	the	
same	time,	he	does	not	conceal	his	opinion	 that	sanctions	are	an	 ineffective	








































































1. the economy and energy
Trade	with	Ukraine	generates	only	0.6%	of	Slovakia’s	trade	(according	to	Slovak	
data	 from	2016).	This	figure	 is	 overshadowed	by	Slovakia’s	 trade	with	Russia,	




























































































































Ukrainian	pipeline	network,	which	was	 signed	 in	April	2017.	The	 letter	was	
a	clear	signal	confirming	 the	Slovak	company’s	 interest	 in	cooperating	with	
Ukraine	on	gas	transit.	At	the	same	time,	it	can	be	read	as	sounding	out	what	
the	EU	operators’	options	might	be	regarding	the	privatisation	of	 the	future	




training	 courses	 designed	 to	 share	 its	 experiences,	 primarily	 in	 the	 area	 of	

















































































governments	 in	 Budapest	 have	 given	 relations	 with	 Moscow	 high	 priority.	
Hungarian-Russian	 cooperation	has	deepened	during	 the	 rule	 of	Viktor	Or-
bán,	 who	 treats	 Russia	 as	 a	 key	 economic	 and	 political	 partner	 within	 the	
framework	of	the	strategy	announced	in	2010	entitled	 ‘Opening	to	the	East’.	


































Since	 the	 Russian-Ukrainian	 gas	 crises	 (in	 2006	 and	 2009),	 Hungary	 has	
sought	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 supply	 route	 for	 Russian	 gas	 to	 Hungary	 which	
would	serve	as	an	alternative	to	the	transit	through	Ukraine.	After	the	fail-















market	 (as	 it	 competes	with	other	European	 companies,	 such	as	 those	 from	
Germany	and	Austria,	which	are	 consistently	active	 in	Russia),	hoping	as	 it	
does	so	that	the	Kremlin	will	appreciate	these	gestures	from	Budapest	when	
the	sanctions	are	lifted	and	the	economic	crisis	in	Russia	has	blown	over.	The	
Hungarian	 government	 has	 invested	 much	 more	 effort	 in	 developing	 eco-
nomic	contacts	with	Russia	(for	example	by	holding	regular	meetings	of	 the	
intergovernmental	 economic	 commission,	 and	 the	 intensive	 development	
of	political	and	business	contacts	with	the	Russian	regions)	than	it	has	with	
























2. hungary on the Russian-ukrainian conflict






























































At	 the	 turn	 of	 2015	 Hungary	 made	 attempts	 to	 improve	 its	 relations	 with	
Ukraine.	This	involved	a	general	correction	in	foreign	policy	after	the	ostenta-
tious	emphasis	on	its	close	relations	with	Russia,	the	rhetorical	undermining	

























ambassadors	 in	 February	2016	he	 stressed	 that	 it	was	 in	Hungary’s	 interest	













































3. areas of cooperation with ukraine
Even	 before	 the	 annexation	 of	 Crimea	 and	 the	 Ukrainian-Russian	 conflict,	
Hungary	had	 activated	gas	 reverse	flow	on	 an	 interconnector	with	Ukraine	
(March	2013).	This	allows	it	to	deliver	gas	at	the	level	of	6.1	bcm	per	year,	al-
though	 the	 actual	 transmission	 volume	 is	 much	 smaller,	 for	 technical	 rea-
sons	 among	 other	 factors	 (it	 operates	 in	 interruptible	mode).	The	 operation	






















































which	 is	exports,	 the	big	Ukrainian	market	 is	an	attractive	destination.	Be-
tween	2009	and	2013	trade	almost	doubled,	and	Ukraine	has	become	Hunga-










































4. hungary’s policy towards the hungarian minorities in ukraine
Although	 the	Hungarians	 in	Ukraine	 are	not	 the	 largest	 ethnic	minority	 in	
that	 country	 (they	number	 about	 150,000	people,	 or	0.3%	of	 the	population	





















































































































































































































Iv. ukRaIne’s polICy towaRds the CzeCh 





























the	areas	mentioned	above.	Concomitantly,	 the	V4’s	 importance	 for	Ukraine	
depends	on	the	strength	of	each	of	this	format’s	members	on	the	international	

































The	 dynamics	 of	 bilateral	 relations	 between	 Ukraine	 and	 Slovakia	 is	much	
greater	because	of	 their	 common	border,	 through	which	 the	pipeline	 repre-
senting	 the	main	 transit	 route	of	Russian	gas	 to	Europe	runs.	 In	Kyiv’s	per-


























































Relations	with	Budapest	have	provoked	an	 internal	debate	 in	Ukraine	of	 far	






Hungary’s	policy	 is	 seen	 in	Ukraine	 through	 the	prism	of	 the	 relationship	
between	Budapest	and	Moscow,	and	the	situation	of	the	Hungarian	minor-
ity.	Kyiv’s	negative	reactions	regularly	induce	statements	from	Viktor	Orbán	











by	 fear	of	 setting	a	precedent	 that	 other	minorities	 could	 invoke,	 especially	
the	Russian	minority.	Relations	with	Russia	are	the	most	important	point	of	

































consolidation	of	 small,	 economically	and	socially	 inefficient	units	 into	 larger	
ones,	the	so-called	nove hromady	or	associated	municipalities.	As	of	1	May	2017,	
only	5	of	the	planned	43	municipalities	of	that	kind	have	been	created	in	the	




















































in	Bratislava	 and	her	husband	were	 accused	 of	 smuggling	 cigarettes	 valued	
at	€22,000	across	the	Ukrainian-Hungarian	border.	(The	Ukrainian	embassy	
can	be	 traditionally	considered	a	sinecure	 for	 the	business	and	political	cir-
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